Cet article analyse le comportement optimal de l'acquéreur initial lors d'une offre publique d'achat. Dans le modèle théorique, l'acquéreur a le choix entre proposer un prix élevé ou un prix faible. Les deux types d'offre peuvent conduire a une surenchère de la part d'un concurrent. Le modèle inclut des coûts d'information ainsi que des coûts liés à l'enchère proprement dite. Les stratégies optimales sont spécifiées selon un modèle d'équilibre bayésien parfait. Il découle du modèle que l'acquéreur initial a intérêt a fixer un prix initial élevé afin de dissuader de potentiels concurrents. Les implications empiriques du modèle sont analysées sur un échantillon d'acquisitions américaines sur la période 1990-1995. Entre autres résultats, on trouve que le la relation entre le niveau de la prime offerte et le degré de surenchère change selon que l'OPA est amicale ou hostile.
Introduction
To determine the amount of the initial bid to launch a takeover, the first bidder has to take into account three considerations. First, the bid has to be accepted by the target shareholders. This condition rises two types of problems. The free rider problem, pointed out by Grossman and Hart (1980) , may occur when shareholders are atomistic and consider that their decision has no impact on the outcome of the takeover. In this case, shareholders are tempted not to submit their shares to freeride on the increase in value resulting from the takeover, thus causing the takeover bid to fail. One manner to avoid such problem is to launch a takeover on the totality of the target stocks. The lemons problem, formulated by Hansen (1987) , may occur when the target has a proprietary information on his own value: the target shareholders accept to sell their stocks only if the bid is higher than the value of the target firm. To avoid the lemons problem, the bidder can offer stock exchange as medium of payment, to make the bid contingent on the success of the acquisition. If the bidder has a proprietary information on his own value too, a double lemons problem arises because the bidder will not offer stock exchange payment when the target underestimates the value of bidder stocks. Thus, the bidder proposes stock exchange payment only if the bidder stocks are overvalued by the target.
Aware of this problem, the target should never accept a stock exchange offer.
A second consideration that has to be taken into account by the first bidder is that the acquisition of the target firm must be profitable for him. This condition requires that the bidder has a fair estimation of the target value. In other words, the bid should never be higher than the target value for the bidder. This condition, if satisfied, rules out the hubris hypothesis mentioned by Roll (1986) , where the bidder pays too much for his acquisition due to over-optimism.
A third consideration is that the initial bid should deter other potential bidders to enter the competition, to avoid expensive auction processes among bidders. 1 The model hereafter supposes that the first two conditions are met. The initial bid is accepted by the target shareholders, because the bid is supposed higher than the reservation price of the target shareholders. And the acquisition is profitable for the initial bidder, because the initial bidder is supposed to get costly information to have a fair estimation of the target value. The focus of this paper is on the third condition, i.e. on the deterring role of the initial bid.
Two conflicting hypotheses may be formulated regarding the impact of the initial bid on the decision of the potential bidder to compete or not. First, the signaling hypothesis states that when the first bidder makes a low initial bid, the first bidder sends the message that he has a low expected value of the target. The potential bidder has thus a strong incentive to enter the competition. Conversely, when the first bidder makes a high initial bid, then the message sent is that the first bidder has a high expected value of the target, i.e. the first bidder will probably compete if the potential bidder overbids. The high initial bid is thus a strong deterrent for the potential bidder not to enter the competition. Second, the efficiency hypothesis supposes that when the first bidder makes a low initial bid, the target value is properly assessed by the market. The bid premium corresponds then to the idiosyncratic gains to the first bidder, and the potential bidder has no incentive to enter the competition. Conversely, when the first bidder makes a high initial bid, the target value is supposed to be strongly undervalued by the market.
In this case, the potential bidder has a strong incentive to enter the competition. Fishman (1988) presents a model where the potential bidder has no private information concerning the target value. There is no uncertainty regarding the outcome of the bid: when the first bidder makes a low initial bid, the potential bidder enters the competition, whereas when the first bidder makes a high initial bid, the potential bidder does not enter the competition. Fishman (1988) supposes the auction process to be costless for the bidders, once the initial information costs paid. He provides a rationale for the first bidder to make a high initial bid, rather than making a low initial bid and raising it in case of competition among bidders. Hirshleifer and Png (1989) propose a model similar to Fishman (1988) with the difference that they include a bidding cost for each overbid when an auction process occurs. They show that, contrary to Fishman (1988) , the price paid with a high initial bid may be higher than the price resulting from an auction process, because bidding costs may deter potential bidders with low synergy to enter the competition. Khanna (1997) presents a model where the first bidder always makes a preemptive initial bid. However, the preemptive initial bid may be followed by competition among bidders. Khanna (1997) shows that, when target management is permitted to resist, the optimal strategy for the first bidder remains to make a high initial bid.
The aim of this paper is to determine the optimal bidding strategy for the initial bidder that deters potential bidders to compete for the same target. The model below takes into account both initial information costs and bidding costs associated to an auction process. Contrary to Giammarino and Heinkel (1986), Fishman (1988) , and Hirshleifer and Png (1989) , the impact of a particular type of initial bid on the decision made by potential bidders to compete or not is uncertain. Both low initial bids and high preemptive initial bids may be followed by a competitive auction process among bidders. Moreover, contrary to Khanna (1997) , the initial bid is not restricted to high preemptive bids only. The first bidder has the choice between making a low initial bid or a high initial bid. The deterring role of the initial bid depends on the beliefs of potential bidders regarding the first bidder's type. More precisely, potential bidders believe that when the initial bid is higher than a given threshold, the probability that the first bidder is of high type is higher than the probability that the first bidder is of low type, and conversely. This paper is divided in five sections: the following section specifies the theoretical model and its assumptions, the third section presents the equilibrium solutions, the fourth section provides an empirical analysis of the model on the US market and the last section summarizes the paper.
Model
The assumptions of the model below are the following. First, there are two potential bidders i,
The second (potential) bidder does not systematically overbid: whether there is a competition or not is endogenously determined by the model. Second, the aim of the bidder and target management is to maximize the wealth of their respective shareholders, to rule out agency conflicts. Moreover, the takeover is on all target equities, to avoid the free rider problem.
Third, all agents (i.e. bidder and target shareholders) are risk neutral, to find equilibrium solutions following the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. Finally, both bidders and the target have private information on the profitability of the acquisition. This last assumption states that there is asymmetry of information between bidders and targets. The model distinguishes between, first, the bidder i expectation of the target value to bidder i, E V i i (~) , on which bidder i bases his bid, second, the target expectation of its own value and, third, the real value of the target to bidder i, Vi, used to determine the real payoffs for each strategy. To avoid the lemons problem, the real value of the target is unknown ex ante, even for the target management. Finally, the target value to bidder i, Vi, includes the idiosyncratic gains resulting from the takeover to bidder i.
The proceeding is the following: at date 0, bidder 1 observes the reservation price of the target, V 0 , which is set to the pre-bid market value of the target, and decides whether or not to launch a takeover. If bidder 1 decides to launch a takeover, he spends k 1 to get more information and offers the amount b1. At date 1, bidder 2 observes b1 and decides whether or not to compete.
If bidder 2 decides to compete, he spends k 2 to get more information and offers b2. Afterwards, an auction process may (or not) follow until one bidder remains with the highest bid. For each overbid, bidder i spends c i as bidding costs.
To describe more formally the takeover proceeding, the following notation is used. The target value to bidder 1 and bidder 2 (i.e. including synergy specific to bidder i) is noted
The target value for bidder 1 and bidder 2 are positively correlated, but the expected payoff to bidder 2 is decreasing in V 1 . This is necessary for bidder 1 to have an incentive to signal that he has a high valuation of the target, in order to deter competition. Let (~) . 2 Nature draws the type of bidder 1 (λ or h) with a known probability set to 0.5 hereafter, 3 and the expected value of the target for bidder 2 is higher than for low-bidder 1 and lower than for high-bidder 1. In other
The problem for bidder 1 is to deter bidder 2 to overbid, by sending a preemptive message through his initial bid, to acquire the target at a bargaining price. So bidder 1 takes into account the reaction that bidder 2 will have to the initial offer made by bidder 1 in choosing the appropriate type of bid to launch the takeover. In other words, the bid made by bidder i depends on bidder 1 type and bidder j action, b b a
Moreover, the bid offered by bidder i is strictly lower than the target value to bidder i, b E V
There is bid threshold, b * , observable by all such that if the initial bid price is lower, b b 1 < * , the probability of an auction is high, because bidder 2 considers that bidder 1 type is low with a high probability. Conversely, if the initial bid price is higher than the bid threshold, b b 1 > * , the probability of an auction is low, because bidder 2 considers that bidder 1 type is low with a low probability. The different levels of the initial bid made by bidder 1 are summarized in Figure 1 , where: (~) reflect the incentive for bidder 1 to acquire the target. Ex post, the target value to bidder 1 is equal to V 1 , whatever the bidder 1 type is. 3 Bidder 1 knows already his own type before playing. However, he has also to know the probability distribution on Nature move in order to anticipate bidder 2 reaction to bidder 1 message. 4 It is supposed implicitly that bidder 2 type is common knowledge for bidder 1, because bidder 1 knows is own type and bidder 1 type is defined by comparison with bidder 2 type. In other words, the expected value of the target for bidder 1 is high or low with respect to the expected value of the target for bidder 2.
Bidder 1 has the choice between three different levels of initial bid. If bidder 1 chooses to offer b λ , the probability of an auction is high because bidder 2 believes that, having observed b λ , the probability µ( ) ⋅ that bidder 1 type is low is higher than the probability that bidder 1 type is
Conversely, if bidder 1 offers b h , the probability of deterring is high because bidder 2 believes that, having observed b h , the probability that bidder 1 type is high is higher than the probability that bidder 1 type is low, i.e. µ θ µ θ ( ) does (resp. does not) overbid if he is high (resp. low) and bidder 2 continues to overbid, once entered in an auction process. If bidder 1 type is low, bidder 2 wins the competition with a higher bid than bidder 1 offer. If bidder 1 type is high, bidder 1 wins the auction and pays one plus
(~) − − for the target, where n is the number of bidder 2 overbids during the auction process. The bid b 2 max corresponds to the maximum price offered by bidder 2, since in this case, the profit to bidder 2 is null. The auction process is resumed by the auction result, i.e.
the highest bid for which the transaction is concluded. The target accepts the offer with the highest value if it is above a known reservation price, V0.
Ex ante, the outcome for the bidders is uncertain for two reasons: first, the equilibrium solutions are contingent on both bidder strategy and, second, the real value of the target is unknown, given an equilibrium solution. The bidders have common knowledge on the entire structure of the game. If this assumption is satisfied, no bidder has interest to play differently from the equilibrium strategy, and the equilibrium provided by the game becomes a valid prediction of what will happen.
The aim of bidder i is to maximize his own payoff, πi, depending on bidder 1 type and action and on bidder 2 action, π π θ
1 2 . The ex post payoffs obtained by the final purchaser immediately after the acquisition are described below. Bidder 1 payoffs are the following:
Bidder 2 payoffs are described below:
( )
An important feature of the model is that the initial bid made by bidder 1 is deterring or not following the probability estimated by bidder 2 that bidder 1 is of a particular type, after having observed bidder 1 action. The bidder 2 beliefs that bidder 1 type is low, given the observed initial
0 , or in other words, if bidder 2 believes that bidder 1 type is low with a probability such that:
)[ ] or in other words, if bidder 2 believes that bidder 1 type is high with a probability such that:
As
, the expression on the right side of inequality (3) is lower than the expression on the right side of (4). The condition (3) is therefore more restrictive than condition (4) and, as a consequence, b λ is less deterring than b h .
Equilibrium
The equilibrium strategies are defined by the Perfect Baysian Equilibrium (PBE) requirements for a signaling game. The following notation is used: ρ θ ( ) denotes bidder 2 prior beliefs (before the game begins) about bidder 1 type, and µ θ ( ) a 1 denotes the posterior probability distribution describing bidder 2 belief about which types θ could have sent any observed message a1 from A1.
denotes bidder 1 pure strategy, prescribing an action a1 for each type θ, and σ 2 2 1 ( ) a a denotes bidder 2 pure strategy, prescribing an action a2 for each action a1.
The equilibrium is analyzed for pooling and separating pure strategies. 5 To find an equilibrium, it is supposed technically that:
i.e. bidder 2 profit when low-type bidder 1 makes a high bid is equal to the costs that bidder 2 incurs if he competes against a high-type bidder 1. So, bidder 2 action depends only on the bidder 2 beliefs regarding bidder 1 type given b h . It follows from (5) that:
The equilibrium strategy for bidder 1 is denoted σ θ is low and high respectively. The equilibrium strategies are described in proposition 1.
Proposition 1 (i) There exists a PBE.
(ii) If ( , ) σ σ 1 2 * * constitutes a PBE, then
Proof: See the Appendix.
In equilibrium E1, both bidder 1 type makes a low initial bid, b λ , and neither b λ nor b h are deterring following bidder 2 beliefs p and q. So bidder 2 enters the competition whatever bidder 1 action is. In equilibrium E2 
and q < 0.5 < p is the second pooling equilibrium E2.
The expected payoffs to bidder 1 and 2, following the equilibrium strategies are described below.
E1
. ,~( , )
. ,~( , ) π θ
Both equilibrium that includes a low initial bid, b λ , in its optimal strategy (i.e. equilibrium E1 and E3) yields a lower expected payoff than the expected payoff resulting from a pooling equilibrium on a high initial bid, b h (i.e. equilibrium E2). Bidder 1 should therefore make high initial bids only, whatever bidder 1 type is. Overall, the most credible equilibrium strategy following bidder 2 beliefs, which is to make a high preemptive initial bid, is also the most profitable for bidder 1. This result gives support to the signaling hypothesis. This follows from Implication 1 and bidder 1 payoff (1d). In raising, the bidding costs lower the bidder 2 maximum bid. So, if c c
< , the decrease of the final bid made by bidder 2 is higher (lower) than the increase of bidder 1 costs.
Empirical analysis
The initial sample covers all the takeover attempts that occurred during the period 1990 to 1995, as listed in Mergerstat Review, with an offered price of USD 100 millions or higher. The initial sample includes 684 takeovers attempts, successful or not. For an acquisition to be listed in the Mergerstat Review, both the offered price and the target's net earnings have to be available.
Statutory mergers are not included in the roster. Finally, the Wall Street Journal Index has been used to complete the missing information for each transaction. The number and the total value of announced takeovers over the period 1990-1995 are reported in Table 1 and Figure 2 . The beginning of the nineties is characterized by a contraction of the takeover market, probably due to the recession that was prevailing during that period. From 1992 to 1995 though, the trend is inverted: the number of takeovers and the total value of announced takeovers increase continuously, as the economic recovery becomes stronger. The takeover activity in 1995 is the highest over the last 20 years, both in terms of number of transactions and total value of takeovers. 6 To be included in the final sample used to conduct the empirical analysis presented below, the following informations are required for each takeover attempts: the announcement year, the buyer's and target's country, the target's industry and sales, the method of payment, the premium and the PE ratio offered, the purchase price to book value (stockholder's equity) ratio, whether the attempt is successful, whether there is competition among bidders, and whether the bid is hostile or friendly. All these variables are defined hereafter. The final sample that includes the takeover cases meeting all these criteria is reduced to 273 takeovers. Finally, more than 97% of the takeovers included in the sample are acquisitions of a public traded company-the other category are Divestiture, Acquisition of a privately owned company, and Acquisition of a foreign based company. Besides, more than 96% of the sample concern acquisitions of 100% of the target's equity.
The characteristics of the final sample (N=273) are presented in Table 2 The average bid price reported in Table 3 is around USD 1,100 million, but this mean may be misleading as bid prices have a large dispersion: they range from USD 100 million to USD 19,000 million. The median is around USD 390 million only, and the three fourth of the sample are composed of bid prices of roughly USD 1,100 million and below. The premiums have a much less wide dispersion than the prices: they range from -63.8% to 138%. The mean and the median are around 30% and three fourth of the sample include takeovers with a premium below 46%.
The PE offered range from 1.1x to 150.0x, averaging 27.0x. The multiples of book offered average 5.7x, whereas for half of the takeovers included in the sample, the bidder pays three times or less the book value of the target stockholder equity to acquire the target. Finally, the target sales have a very wide dispersion: they range from USD 7.8 million to USD 114,038.0 million. The median is USD 617.0 million and three fourth of the sample concern acquisitions of target firms with USD 1,800 million sales or below. Table 4 reports that the proportion of cash offers increases with the premium: 25.0% of the cash offers are launched with a low premium, whereas this percentage raises to 43.1% for high premiums. Cash offers are thus more often associated with high premiums than with any other level of premium.
The higher percentage (42.9%) of the takeovers incurring a competition follows a high premium, and conversely, the lowest percentage (22.9%) of the takeovers incurring a competition follows a low premium. In other words, the percentage of having a competition is 8.8% when the offered premium is low, and this percentage raises to 16.5% after a high bid premium.
Launching a takeover with a high premium does not seem to deter other potential bidders to compete. This finding contradicts the conclusions reached in the theoretical part. The percentage of successful takeovers is negatively related to the bid premium: 34.6% of the successful takeovers follow a low premium, whereas 31.6% only follow a high premium. This finding is probably due to the fact that higher premiums are associated with hostile takeovers and competition among bidders, resulting in a lower percentage of successful offers.
Half of the foreign buyers launch their takeovers with a high bid premium, and all the foreign targets are offered a high premium.
In accordance with the intuition, the proportion of takeovers launched with a low premium increases with an economy in recession (as for the beginning of the nineties) and decreases with an expanding economy (except in 1995).
The computer software industry is the sector having the highest percentage of takeovers offering a high premium. This is certainly due to the high expectation of growth in a high-tech sector.
The percentage of takeovers with a high offered price is positively related to the level of the bid premium. In other words, the larger the takeover is (in terms of offered prices), the higher the bid premium is.
Finally, the percentage of the takeovers with a low PE and a low multiple to book ratio is negatively related to the level of the bid premium. In other terms, the takeovers launched with a low PE and multiple are also logically offered a low bid premium.
To test the null hypothesis of independence between the variable PREMIU and the other variables, the Chi-square statistics are reported in Table 4 Table 5 reports that 25.0% of the cash offers are hostile, whereas this percentage drops to 3.5% only for the stock offers. As a result, 34.3% of the competitive offers are hostile, and this percentage falls to 8.8% for non-competitive offers. In other terms, 36.4% of the hostile takeovers incur a competition, whereas 9.6% only of the friendly takeovers incur a competition. Again, all 7 The cross-tabulations between the variables HOSTIL and COMPET and the variables BUYCOU, TARCOU, INDUST and YEAR have not been reported in Table 5 and 6 in order to save space. The results are available upon request to the authors. these relationship are strongly significant. Table 5 reports also a strong relationship between HOSTIL and SUCCES: when the offer is hostile, the percentage of being successful is much lower (7.7%) than when the offer is friendly (92.3%). Finally, the percentage of hostile offers increases drastically and significantly with the price and the bid premium offered. In other words, large takeovers (i.e. with a high purchase price) are more hostile than small takeovers, and hostile takeovers result in higher bid premiums than friendly takeovers. The strong relationships between COMPET and the variables METPAY and HOSTIL have already been discussed above. Table 6 reports also a strongly significant dependence between COMPET and SUCCES: when there is a competition among bidders for the same target, the percentage of success is only 9.0%, whereas this percentage raises to 91.0% when there is no competitive bidding. The initial bidder has thus a strong incentive to deter other potential bidders to enter the competition for the same target. Finally, Table 6 reports a strongly significant relationship between COMPET and the variables PRICE and MULTIP, but no trend between these variables is clearly defined. The probability of a takeover incurring a competition depending on the level of the bid premium is investigated with a multinomial Logit model. The polytomous explanatory variable is PREMIU (with the possible values: Low, Medium, or High), and the dichotomous response variable is COMPET. The expected number of offers incurring a competition with the level of bid premium i is denoted mi1, and the expected number of offers incurring no competition with the level of bid premium i is denoted mi0, where i ∈ {L,M,H} represents respectively the index for a Low, Medium, or High bid premium. The Logit model is the following:
where λ is the baseline term, and δi is the term due to the level of bid premium chosen. The equivalent loglinear model is described by equation (11).
where αi is the main-effects term of the variable PREMIU i, βj is the main-effects term of the variable COMPET, γij is the interaction term between PREMIU and COMPET, j = 1 is the index for an offer incurring a competition and j = 0 is the index for an offer without competition. 8 The results of the loglinear model (11) and Logit model (10) are reported in Tables 7 and 8 respectively. The estimated odds of having a competition among bidders after a particular bid premium are the following: 
The comparison of equations (9) and (10) The highest odds to have a competition follow a high bid premium, whereas the lowest odds to have a competition follow a low bid premium. Finally, it is 2.1 times (0.197/ 0.096) more probable to have a competition after a high bid premium than after a low bid premium.
As high bid premiums appear to be intrinsically associated with hostile offers, the question turns to be: when the initial bidder decides to launch a hostile takeover, which level of bid premium is the most deterring for other bidders to enter the competition ? Table 9 reports the results of the cross-tabulations between the variables PREMIU and COMPET, for hostile takeovers only. From Table 9 , the results found previously are partially inverted: for hostile offers, the percentage of having a competition after a high bid premium (29.0%) is lower than after a medium bid premium (37.5%), but remains higher than with a low bid premium (27.3%). Moreover, the null hypothesis of independence between PREMIU and COMPET can not be rejected. To conclude, no overwhelming deterring effect resulting from the level of the bid premium is reported empirically. However friendly takeovers may not follow the same logic as our model as they may not require to have a strategic behaviour to deter potential
competition. An analysis of hostile takeovers shows that making a high bid premium to launch a takeover seems to be more deterring than a medium premium, which (weakly) confirms the conclusions reached in the theoretical part, but less deterring than a low bid premium. Finally, it remains that the lack of a strong evidence regarding the deterring effect of the level of the bid premium may be due to the small size of the sample.
Conclusion
The optimal bidding strategy for the initial bidder in takeover contests is investigated. The initial bidder has the choice between making a low or a high preemptive initial bid. Both types of bid can lead to a competitive auction process among bidders. The deterring role of the initial bid depends on the beliefs of the potential bidder regarding the first bidder type. Moreover, both information and bidding costs are included in the analysis. The equilibrium strategies are specified following the Perfect Baysian Equilibrium requirements. The model predicts notably that the best strategy for the initial bidder is to make a high preemptive initial bid, independently of the expected value of the target for the initial bidder. This strategy deters potential bidders to compete for the same target.
Empirically, it is found that competition follows more often high initial bids than low initial bids, because high initial bids are inherently related to hostile offers which, in turn, are strongly related to competitive bidding. In controlling for hostile takeovers, competition among bidders follows more often medium offers rather than low or high bids. This is probably due to the fact that medium offers send a troubled message to the market participants. Our theoretical model is therefore only weakly confirmed by the empirical results. The sample used in this study is however relatively small and more empirical work is needed before definitive conclusions about the validity of the model can be drawn. constitute a separating PBE in equilibrium E3.
